University of Missouri, St. Louis

IRL @ UMSL
UMSL Global
1-1-1997

The Quality of Democracy Mass-Elite Linkages in the Czech
Republic
Andrew T. Green
Carol Skalnik Leff

Follow this and additional works at: https://irl.umsl.edu/cis
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Green, Andrew T. and Leff, Carol Skalnik, "The Quality of Democracy Mass-Elite Linkages in the Czech
Republic" (1997). UMSL Global. 84.
Available at: https://irl.umsl.edu/cis/84

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in UMSL
Global by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.

Occasional Paper No. 9706
May, 1997

Occasional Papers
The Center for International Studies
of the University of Missouri-St. Louis
issues Occasional Papers at irregular
intervals from ongoing research projects,
thereby providing a viable means for
communicating tentative results. Comments
on these papers, therefore, are particularly
welcome. Occasional Papers should not be
reproduced or quoted at length without the
consent of the author or of the Center for
International Studies.

The Quality of Democracy: Mass-Elite
Linkages in the Czech Republic

Andrew T. Green
Carol Skalnik Leff

THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY: MASS-ELITE
. LINKAGES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Andrew T. Green
Department of Political Science
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Carol Skalnik Leff
Department of Political Science
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Andrew T. Green is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Carol Skalnik Leff is Assistant Professor of
Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. The original version
of this paper was presented at the Central Slavic Conference, University of MissouriColumbia, October 3-5, 1996. Its publication as part of this occasional paper series is
supported by the University of Missouri-Research Board funded project.'.'Beyond-the Iron
Curtain: Legitimacy, Identity, Security." Project Director: Dr. Robin· Alison
Remington, Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-Columbia. The paper
is scheduled for publication in the journal Democratization in late 1997 or early .1998.
Andrew Green gratefully acknowledges the support of the Institute of International
Education and the Institute for the Study of World Politics in pursuing research on
associations and the policymaking process in the Czech Republic during the 1995-96
academic year, as well as the help and guidance of Professors Lubomir Brokl and
Zdenka Mansfeldova of the Institute of Sociology at the Czech Academy of Sciences.
0

1

THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY:
MASS-ELITE LINKAGES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

ANDREW T. GREEN and CAROL SKALNIK LEFF

Minimalist definitions of democracy that focus on competitive elections and observance of
basic political rights have been the standard for cross-national studies that examine the correlates of
democracy, as well as the baseline for many individual and regional studies of democratic
transitions. However justified this standard may be in such cases, it is nonetheless of limited utility in
the analysis of democratization projects that have completed the initial transition and are--or are not-consolidating. At this stage, it becomes necessary to begin to ask about the quality and dynamics of
new democracies, and to extend the definitional field of vision to more complex understandings of
how they function. The Czech Republic is a case in point.
The Czech Republic has been widely regarded as one of the major political and economic
success stories in the early years of post-communist transition: as the first state to gain OECD
membership, with the most creditable economic transformation project, and the lowest
unemployment rate, the Czechs have been touted as "bloc champs" in the transition game. The Czech
Republic seems, by good fortune and good management, to have been politically unique in several
notable respects. The strength and determination of the prime minister, Vaclav Klaus, and the
integrity and credibility of the president, Vaclav Havel, are recognized and respected at home and
abroad. There have been few of the overt confrontational crises between the two executives that have
marked politics in such neighboring states as Poland and Slovakia. In contrast with other
post-communist states, the ex-communist left has never achieved the electoral success that would
have permitted its exercise of power. Indeed, Czech politics is unique among post-communist states
in that the strongest left party is not ex-communist at all; the Social Democrats (CSSD), rather than
the rigid communists, now dominate the left, and have yet to share in governance.
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Moreover, Czech governments have also been rather stable by regional standards. The first
two post-communist governments functioned from election to election without a loss of
parliamentary confidence and without significant partisan recomposition, despite the characteristic
fluidity of the parties themselves, which generated party schisms and defections in the Czech
Republic as elsewhere. Accordingly, while the average cabinet duration in the region as a whole is
little more than a year, Czech cabinets have averaged three years in duration, with tenures in office
outstripping the West European average. Finally, popular satisfaction with the Klaus government has
until recently been strikingly high in comparison to ratings accorded neighboring regimes. This
performance record seems to suggest an atypically smooth democratic transition, with popular
rewards for the unusually strong economic performance of the post-communist governments.
Despite these positive indicators, though, the 1996 parliamentary and senatoral elections
suggest that this exemplary state is also prey to democratic deficiencies. In the parliamentary
elections, Klaus's Civic Democratic Party (ODS) once again emerged as the strongest party, but the
Klaus government returned to office as a minority government. The senatoral elections were marred
by a dramatic drop in voter turnout, the virtual abandonment of ODS by the junior coalition parties,
and the election of former Czechoslovak prime minister and Klaus nemesis, Petr Pithart, as Senate
Chairman.
Analysis of the surprisingly confused outcomes of the 1996 Czech elections tells a complex
story about Czech politics, but more importantly it points to an underlying dynamic with significant
implications for the study of democratization. As Schmitter notes, scholars generally posit that "the
legitimacy and hence the long-term viability of a given democratic regime depend upon how well ...
external linkages with civil society function." 1 The key to the development and durability of
democracy is thus found in the health and vitality of the mass-elite linkage, a linkage that is generally

I

Phillippe Schmitter, '1he consolidation of Political Parties: Processes, Rhythms, Sequences, and Types,' in Geoffrey Pridham (ed.),
Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives From Southern Europe. Latin America, and Eastern Europe (Brookfield,
VT: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1995), p.558.
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understood to involve more than infrequent, episodic acts of voting. Since Locke, discussions of the
state-society relationship have centered on the policymaking ability of the state and how society can
influence and control it; that is, the ability of citizens or groups to participate in, communicate ideas
to, and gain influence over policymaking strengthens democracy.
In this analysis, we pursue this focus on the mass-elite linkages that underpin the democratic
process, broadly defined to include both electoral participation and engagement in the policymaking
process. In the following sections, we will first frame the issue of mass-elite linkage in general terms,
before assessing the Czech case in several stages: the pattern of popular attitudes toward government
and government policy; the character of the policymaking process in providing or failing to provide
organized access and support for the development of associational life; and the reflection of these
two variables in the pattern of Czech participation in politics. We argue that this understanding not
only sheds light on the narrower conundrum of the Czech election results, but, more broadly,
demonstrates the value of directing scholarly analysis of democratization to the endeavor of mapping
out characteristic linkage patterns between state and society that transcend the electoral connection as
such.

Democracy And The Mass-Elite Linkage
The question frequently posed in journalistic accounts and by attentive international
policymakers is "how democratic or undemocratic is a given state?" Indeed, scholars are also
concerned with assessing the prospects for the consolidation of democracy, and accordingly
themselves attempt such evaluations, implicitly or explicitly. The preponderance of scholarly
attention that has been devoted to party systems in the electoral process in post-communist
transitions is understandable, given the availability of data and the high salience of electoral contests
for minimalist definitions of democracy, but it also offers only a partial snapshot of the political
process. It might be more productive to frame the question somewhat differently, particularly in
states that meet the standard minimalist requirements for identification as fledgling democracies
(competitive and meaningful elections, relatively open information systems). The question then

4

becomes, not merely how much democracy, but in what form? What is the character of the
democratic process? This is particularly true because a political system is not in fact a checklist of
democratic indicators, but rather a dynamic process that must be conceptualized and investigated as a
whole, and which may exhibit its own distinctive characteristics, regardless of its familial
resemblance to the larger class of democratic polities. 2
For example, the interwar Czechoslovak parliamentary system--its first twentieth-century
experiment in transition from authoritarian (Habsburg) rule--is understood as the only East European
democratic experiment to have survived intact up to World War II. Yet we learn little of its evolving
dynamics and operational mechanisms from that designation. Czechoslovak parliamentary
democracy functioned, in the face of considerable partisan fragmentation, on the basis of a closely
coordinated and continually re-negotiated relationship amongst the core non-extremist parliamentary
parties. Election outcomes were not decisive: Czechoslovak governments did face and respond to
'
opposition, but without clearcut rotation in office; rather, ruling coalitions shifted at the margins as
often as once a year, with continuous delicate adjustments in the ruling core of perpetual cabinet
ministers who aged over the course of the Republic without systematic renewal or promotion of a
rising generation of politicians. Interwar Czechoslovak democracy was thus a closely held
corporation, in which mass-elite electoral linkages were not decisive in promoting clear policy shifts.
Moreover, despite an ideologically varied press and the legality of non-system parties such as the
Communists, sensitive areas touching on the state's identity and security were regulated through
some measure of censorship, police monitoring of public gatherings, and a Law for the Defense of
the Republic that restrained the scope of free speech. The complexity of the state's multi-national
composition and its regional disparities in economic development, coupled with its parlous
international position, created a distinct pattern of conflict control that tended to limit the impact of

2 For a critique of the use of amalgamated indices of democracy, see Gerardo Munck, 'Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of
Democratization,' Working Paper #28 (Notre Dame, IN: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1996), pp.21-24.
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popular mobilization and introduced some clear rigidities into the political process, rigidities that
ultimately undermined any unified Czech and Slovak response to the German challenge of 193 8 and
strengthened the post-war Communist electoral position. 3
The point here is not to reassign Czechoslovakia from its conventional designation as a
democracy, but rather to emphasize that such a designation is only the topic sentence of a paragraph,
that fails to capture essential political strengths and pathologies. Nor is it sufficient to focus on the
gross anatomy of its institutional structure to categorize it, for example, as a unitary parliamentary
system. The way in which a political system structures societal input--a central question in the
analysis of democratic dynamics--may vary considerably regardless of commonalties of basic formal
institutional design, and this variance may have profound effects on the way key issues are
processed, and on the durability and adaptability of the system.

It is this systemic perspective that we bring to bear on the development ofthe
post-communist political process in the Czech Republic. Samuel Huntington has suggested that "as
formal democratic institutions are adopted by more and more diverse societies, democracy itself is
becoming more differentiated." 4 David Collier and Steven Levitsky have done valuable work to
promote clearer thinking on this question, in a survey of scholarly attempts to develop typologies of
democratic functioning: "democracy with adjectives," adjectives that refine the functioning of the
political process. 5 Their review of the democratic subtypes identified by scholars of
democratization--"delegative democracy," "consociational democracy," "maj oritarian

3 See for example, Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking ofa State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1988). An important scholarly critic of the broad functioning of democracy in the First Czechoslovak Republic is F. Gregory Campbell. See, for example, his
'Empty Pedestals,' Slavic Review, Vol.44 (Spring 1985).

4 Samuel P. Huntington, 'Democracy for the Long Haul,' Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (April 1996), p.10.

5 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy 'with adjectives': Finding Conceptual Order in Recent Comparative Research,' paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1994.
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democracy"--highlights the logic of current attempts to define radial types of democracy, all of
which share common features, but which function according to some distinctive logics. The current
analysis shares the focus of such undertakings.
It may be premature, however, to characterize in broadbrush strokes the kinds of
democracies that may emerge in post-communist Eastern and Central Europe. The purpose of our
analysis is accordingly more modest. Here, we follow Schmitter in his admonition that "conceptual
effort might better be directed towards understanding the interrelationships of specific sets of
institutions, toward structuration of a pattern" of linkages,6 and attempt to assess the patterning of
what he terms the "partial regimes" that link the state with civil society, inclusive of, but not limited
to, the electoral connection.
A healthy civil society capable of engaging state institutions is widely asserted, sometimes
without elaboration, to be a basic prerequisite of successful democratization. It is generally defined
as a voluntary, autonomous "realm of organized social life," encoII1passing a vast array of
organizations mediating between individuals and political institutions. 7 It is often argued that groups
must be pluralist in nature: that is, they may not be maximalist groups seeking to conquer the state,
nor corporatist groups with strong ties to the state. Limiting the scope of civil society to bottom-up
organizations as the sole channel for interest aggregation and communication is unnecessarily
restrictive, however. First, this downplays the reality and potential of corporatist organizations,
which are top-down organizations specifically sanctioned by the state for the negotiation of policy
issues. 8 Second, doing so ignores both the potential impact of anti-system groups, and, more
6

Schmitter, p. 554.

7

See Larry Diamond, 'Toward Democratic Consolidation,' Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.3 (July 1994). pp.6ff; and Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato. Civil Society
and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1992), Parts I and III, especially Chapter 3 in Part I.

8 The critical issue is not as is often claimed, autonomy from the state, but rather involves questions of intra-organizational democracy and representational
monopoly. both of which vary for top-down organizations as well as for bottom-up organizations.
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importantly, the possibility that attitudes and strategies of groups supporting democracy may change
over time to regime opposition. Here, then, civil society will be understood to encompass all
associational activity in pursuit of interests of all kinds. Not all such activity, of course, is directed
at influencing policy or constraining state actions, nor are all such groups completely autonomous.
Associations are needed to restrain arbitrary state action as well as to aggregate and express
variegated societal interests. In tum, active citizen participation is the catalyst for the organization
and functioning of associations. The communication of information and ideas is necessary to
encourage participation, stimulate new interests, afford policymaking institutions a clearer grasp of
the stakes and impact of existing policies, and guard against abuses of state power. Through access to
policymaking institutions, societal norms are promulgated that, in tum, strengthen the legitimacy of
the state. We are thus concerned with the dynamics of associational engagement with cabinet
governments, bureaucracy and legislative institutions in the nascent Czech democracy. It is through
an examination of how the Czech political system structures political participation that we hope to
enlarge the scope of inquiry into the development of a stable democratic environment.
Public Opinion and Czech Politics
An understanding of public response to the political system and key political actors cannot in
itself define the contours of the political system; the linkage between attitudes and behavior is
modulated by other variables, and the character of the political system itself may be only obliquely
refracted through the prism of popular consciousness. But public opinion data can serve as a
diagnostic exercise in identifying trouble spots in the mass-elite linkage. In this section, therefore, we
review trends in the evolution of public opinion regarding the functioning of the political system.

In common with other post-communist experiments, the Czech public showed a decline in
popular trust in institutions from an initial peak, as the optimism and euphoria of the initial transition
period gave way everywhere in the region to a more sober assessment of regime competence and
responsiveness. However, a preliminary comparative comment is in order. In survey after survey,
Czech respondents have tended to show a fairly high degree of optimism about the future and a
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greater sense of post-communist progress compared to the publics of other post-communist states.
Czechs were more likely than others, for example, to feel themselves better off after the collapse of
communism than before. Symptoms of Czech disaffection with politics must be understood,
therefore, in the context of the general dilemma of achieving democratic legitimacy in transitional
regimes. We are clearly not arguing that the Czech case is uniquely problematic; in important and ,
already well-recognized respects, in fact, the Klaus government parlayed its economic performance
and control of unemployment levels into a stronger position than most post-communist governments
enjoyed.
A more focused analysis of the pattern of Czech popular reactions to post-communist politics,
however, does help isolate distinctive weaknesses in the mass-elite linkage that may prove
consequential in the longer term. It is true that the public approves of the range of political choice
offered in the emerging party system, with some 80 percent feeling that elections do provide ge1::mine
alternatives. Since independence in 1992, the majority of the population have been generally satisfied
with the functioning of democracy, a proportion that compares favorably with attitudinal patterns in
neighboring states. 9 It is important to note, however, that this response does not signal popular
sentiment that the mass-elite connection is a healthy and resonant one. Equally impressive majorities
feel, and have felt since at least 1992, that their representatives quickly lost touch with the electorate
(86%) and that there is little chance for ordinary citizens to influence government (82%). 10 In a 1995
survey, less than ten percent felt that they could influence governmental decisions, even though more
than half would have liked to. Moreover, the means they visualized for influencing policy focused
largely on electoral choice and confrontational methods such as strikes and demonstrations; only one

9 Eurobarometre Survey (Brussels: Commission of European Communities, 1994), cited in Charles Gati, 'If Not Democracy, What?: Leaders, Laggards and Losers
in the Post-communist World,' in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), Post-Communism: Four Perspectives (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1996), p.179.

10 Data from opinion studies by SIBM (Stredisko empirickych vyzkumu), Trendy 1/1996: 'Skepticismus obcanu k participaci na politicke moci (demokracie v zajeti
obcanske anomie)' and 'Spokojenost s politickum denim.' It should be noted however that older, less educated and left-wing voters tend to be the greatest skeptics,
and that supporters of the current right-center government show the strongest feelings of efficacy.
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percent of the public contemplated working through parties and associations to negotiate policy
outcomes. 11 Czech opinion analysts have thus concluded that most Czechs perceive their political
influence as "beginning and ending" with the act of voting, and that other forms of participation and
engagement in the policy process are ineffectual. 12
The pattern of public opinion on key political issues is far from formless. As Evans and
Whitefield have argued, the initially labile post-communist party systems are increasingly more
rooted in social bases, with a concomitant increase of coherence in the alignment of political forces. 13
In the Czech case, the emergence of a left-right continuum in the party system, accompanied by
regular variations of emphasis on key social and economic issues across electoral constituencies, is
becoming clearer. While concern for crime and health care issues are not differentiated by class or
economic status, other issues are, and show a distinct left-right polarity. What was initially a party
system that appeared to lack its historically strong left wing has developed since 1989 into a more
intelligible bimodal pattern with basically moderate electoral centers in ODS on the right and CSS_D
on the left. The optimists--those who approve of the functioning of democracy, and who feel that
their own economic situation is improving or gives prospects of improving-- have formed the core
constituency of the Klaus government and his ODS in particular since 1992.
If this spectrum is intelligible, however, it is not devoid of troubling elements. A STEM poll
in June 1996 captured a popular image of Klaus's ODS as competent and purposeful, but also
arrogant and unresponsive to social problems. 14 Moreover, beyond the moderate parties lie
11 Lubomir Brok!, 'Parlament, vlada a prezident ocima obcanu,' Lidove Noviny 13 October 1995, p.20.

12 People haven't tuned out for this reason: political interest expressed in polls remains relatively high, for better or worse, including among groups most skeptical of
government responsiveness, such as older voters. STEM, TRENDY 1/1996: 'Politika pritahuje nektere skupiny lidi silneji.'

13 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe,' British Journal of Political Science, Vol.23, No.4 (1993).

14 CTK News Summary, 3 July 1996.
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anti-democratic extremist parties at both ends of the continuum, whose presence raises particularly
pointed questions about any hasty assurance that all is well with state-society linkages. The
unrepentant Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) may have proved too rigid to
dominate the left as reform communists do in most post-communist states--refusing defiantly even to
change its name as all other post-communist parties in the region did--but it retains an electoral
following well above the electoral threshold. On the right, Miroslav Sladek's neo-fascist and
anti-Semitic Republican Party is vocally skeptical of the existing political system. Adherents of these
parties, jointly comprising close to a fifth of the electorate, show an opinion profile that manifests
policy disaffection and skepticism about the functioning of Czech democracy. Clearly, a significant
proportion of the public feels alienated from the democratic regime.
Also relevant to the shape of public opinion is the pattern of policy preferences and priorities,
and the way in which this pattern meshes with perceptions of government efficacy. Here, too, we
find some problematic elements that, we will argue, are directly relevant to the larger pattern of
limited popular efficacy. Table 1 shows that the problems considered most urgent are precisely those
that the government is perceived as handling ineffectively, while Table 2 shows that even
non-government parties, including the anti-system Republicans, are viewed as better able to deal
with many pressing problems. An important question, therefore, is how capable the political system
is of responding to such concerns. It is for that reason that it is important to pay heed to the
policymaking process itself, an examination that does not offer encouraging answers.
[ TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]

Policymaking
Elections are an imperfect indicator of society's linkages to the democratic process, both
because elections occur infrequently and episodically, and because they capture societaLinterests and
policy preferences only indirectly. In light of these limitations, it should be clear that any analysis of
mass-elite linkages cannot rest solely on investigation of the electoral process. A more useful and
complete way to examine the connections between society and the democratic process is to focus on
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policymaking, for it is here that societal interests and preferences may be translated into concrete
action on an ongoing basis by the state. Indeed, democratization studies generally assign to society
an important role in democratization precisely because the inability of groups to participate in,
communicate ideas to, and gain influence over policymaking is understood to diminish democracy;
this incapacity may produce potentially serious pathologies-- apathy, extremism, and shifts to
extra-institutional political expression.
This emphasis on groups, ideas, and access to the policymaking process is paralleled by
developments in the public policy literature. 15 As policy scholars turned to the dynamic issue of
policy change, the discussion of policymaking moved from simplistic discussions of group
competition to a more static picture of exclusionary relationships, and from there to a more dynamie
perspective involving such variables as the ability of groups to organize, their activities, the changing
content of ideas, and the institutional environment. 16 Any conception of societal engagement in the
democratic process must therefore incorporate an understanding of policymaking that frames the
interaction of groups, ideas and institutions. This section analyzes the development of associations in
the Czech Republic, discusses the flow of information between society, groups and the state, and
then examines the role played by groups and information flows in the Czech policymaking process, a
role that remains significantly stunted.

15

16

Despite this parallel, policymaking is a much-neglected aspect in democratization studies; when it is included, it often utilizes outdated,
heavily criticized models of policymaking. See Andrew Green, 'Civil Society, Ideas and Policymaking,' Czech Sociological Review
(forthcoming), for a critique of how two typical conceptions of civil society incorporate policymaking.

See Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), for
a discussion of the evolution of policy research.
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The Development ofAssociations in Czech Society
The development of bottom-up associations in the Czech Republic has been slow and
hesitant, in no small part due to the legal vacuum in which such associations--particularly non-profit
organizations--have existed in all post-communist states. The Law on Association of Citizens of
1990 provided a general framework forlegally sanctioned associational activity, 17 by establishing a
basic definition of civic associations, including registration, ·liquidation procedures, and limits to .
their activities. It quickly became obvious to many, however, that it was inadequate for organizations
beyond sports booster clubs, parent-teacher organizations and stamp collectors. In particular, the
embryonic non-profit sector wanted to distinguish itself from such groups, in order to justify and
promote a Western-style model of tax exemptions, donations, and access to government contracts. At
the same time, however, the Czechoslovak government was revamping the tax code, and raised the
concern that granting tax advantages to associations without clearly distinguishing between types of
associations would exacerbate existing abuse, fraud and loss of tax revenue. 18
This situation was partially remedied in the general overhauling of the Civic Code in
November 1991. 19 The section dealing with citizen associations was amended to distinguish between
civil associations and foundations, defining the latter as grant-making endowed institutions. This
change, too, was inadequate, as most non-profit groups fit neither the definition of civil associations
nor foundations, leaving organizations providing free health care, shelters for battered women, drug
rehabilitation services, or environmental education in a legal vacuum. Between 1992 and 1995, in a

17

18

19

Zakon 83/1990, o sdruzovani obcanu.

Jiri Kahele and Martin Potucek, The Formation and Implementation of Social Policy in the Czech Republic as a Political Process
(Prague: START Foundation, 1995), p.23.

Zakon 509/1991, o obcanskem zakoniku.
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reflection of government ambivalence and alternative priorities, the legal treatment of associations in
such areas as taxation, inheritance, real estate and fee exemptions was unclear and inconsistent,
favorable status and exemptions came and went, and legislation was enacted that incorporated terms
without legal definition or that contradicted itself at points. After several years of delay, the Law on
Public Benefit Societies, specifically aimed at providing a legal framework for non-profit
organizations, passed in September 1995, but was acknowledged by all parties involved to be flawed
and imperfect, albeit necessary in any form; proposed amendments are expected in 1997. 20
Despite the uncertain legal environment, the growth of civic associations, foundations, and
other non-profit groups has been dramatic. Starting in 1989, when no autonomous groups were legal,
new associations developed out of existing state organizations related to sports, culture, hobbies, or
education, so that more than 32,000 organizations were registered with the state by the end of
1994.21It should be noted that although funding for these organization has increased annually, the
majority of this funding is directed to physical education, recreation, education, and sports at all
levels, and the distribution of funds is based largely on pre-1989 organizational relationships. 22
Moreover, foundations were not eligible for this funding. What is most striking is the overwhelming
20

21

22

The Law on National Foundations, passed in spring 1996, provided the institutional and administrative framework for distributing funds
set aside from privatization proceedings to projects proposed by organizations meeting the stipulated criteria. There is considerable
dispute between the government and other political leaders over how much money has actually accrued, which must be resolved before
the agency can be established. In addition, the government still wants to deal with the question of how to spin off many existing state
organizations as either budgetary or quasi-budgetary organizations, an issue that held up the Law on Public Benefit Societies, because
these organizations would supersede public-benefit societies.

Almost 4,000 new civil associations were registered with the state in 1990 alone, and in excess of32,000 civil associations and
foundations were registered by the end of 1994. More than 28,000 of these were civil associations, roughly 20,000 of which were
concerned with sports, schools or culture. Foundation growth has also been impressive, increasing from 1500 in 1992 to 4200 by the end
of 1995. Information taken from Socially-Oriented Non-Profit Organizations in the Czech Republic (Prague: NROS, 1994), pp.13-33;
'Pevny rad dobrocinnosti,' Ty den, No.13 (25 March 1996).

Funding from the state for civil associations has increased from approximately Kc 960 million in 1993 to almost Kc 1600 million in
1994; 'The Activity ofFoundations and Civil Associations Working in Health and Social Services,' Bulletin ICN, No.I (1995), pp.6-7;
Socially-Oriented Non-Profit Organizations in the Czech Republic, pp.20-33; Rachel Stein, The Not-for-Profit Sector in the Czech
Republic 1994 (Prague: ICN, 1995), p.23.
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dependence of civil associations, particularly those in social, health, or human rights services, on
state funds.
With regard to top-down organizations, one corporatist group has been sanctioned by the
state to negotiate certain economic policy issues. 23 In October 1990, the Czechoslovak government
set up the Council of Economic and Social Agreement, later called the Council for Dialogue of
Social Partners (RDSP),24 composed of representatives of the government, employers, and
employees--a classic corporatist configuration in its composition. Employers' interests are
represented by the Confederation of Entrepreneurial and Employers' Federations and the Federation
oflndustries, while employees are represented by the Czech-Moravian Chamber of Union
Federations (CMKOS) and the Confederation of Art and Culture. 25 Agreements worked out by the
RDSP are politically but not legally binding, and thus must be introduced to parliament by the
government as proposed legislation. RDSP negotiates such policy issues as wages, collective
bargaining, re-training, and workplace safety; the issues of prices and insurance lurk in the
background.
Despite recognition accorded labor in the RDSP, though, the Czech government has acted
aggressively to inhibit the development of labor organization. The Labor Code of 1990 restricted
previous union prerogatives in employee dismissal and access.to meetings to senior management,
while additional legislation that year abolished the short-lived experiment in the election of plant
management; in the face of vocal labor opposition, the labor law was amended in 1994 to place
23

24

25

Martin Potucek, 'Faktory, akteri a problemy socialni reformy,' in Martin Potucek, Miroslav Purkrabek, Petr Hava et al, Analyza udalosti
verejne politiky v Ceske republice, I. di! (Prague: Charles University, 1994), pp.22-24. Zdenka Mansfeldova, 'Tripartitajako model
prostredkovani zajmu v politickem systemu Ceske republiky,' Working Papers (Prague: Sociologicky ustav, 1996), sections 2-4.l.

Rad hospodarske a socialni dohody, later Rad pro dialog socialnich partneru.

Konfederaci podnikatelskych a zamestnavatelskych svazu, Svaz prumyslu, Ceskomoravska komora odborovych svazu, Konfederaci
umeni a kultury.
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further limitations on union prerogatives. 26 Labor and Social Affairs Minister Jindrich Vodicka
argued in November 1995 that Czech unions should not be as strong as their West European
counterparts, lest they impede economic development. He added, with emphasis, that the government
was strong enough to block union efforts to play a more prominent role. 27 Vodicka's argument for
weak unions sparked a sharp retort from labor leaders, of course, but more important here is the fact
that his remarks seem characteristic of an.active·and explicit government concern with the "political
demobilization" of unions. We will encounter this pattern again, for it is indicative of a broader
government resistance to fostering a dense institutionalized network of mass-elite linkages.

Communication Oflnformation And Ideas Between State And Society
The second element in this analysis of policymaking sketches the general state of the
communication of information and ideas between the state, groups, and society. While this is
difficult to define and quantify, some indicators of communication can be examined: perception and
attitudes toward civil society, and information flows.
Perceptions and attitudes toward associations, non-profit groups in particular, are generally
not very favorable. Premier Klaus's opposition to legislation or state support of any kind is well
known from his 1994 debate with President Havel on the concept of civil society, from his
statements warning of the danger of groups standing between individuals and the state, and from his
focus on election results as the sole means of identifying and validating the interests and ideas of
individuals. The leak in 1995 of a State Intelligence Service (BIS) report listing some
hitherto-peaceful environmental groups alongside demonstrably violent neo-fascist groups as
"extremist," which allowed for BIS surveillance of their activities, is an interesting insight into the
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government's suspicion of civil society. Such suspicion is not universally shared in the premier's
party nor in the coalition, however, as Tomas Jezek of ODS and Jan Kalvoda of the Civic
Democratic Alliance (ODA) have been strong supporters of legislation supporting the development
of civil society. Despite the division of opinion among coalition party leaders, the general perception
among politicians and the public alike is that the non-profit sector in particular is rife with abuse,
fraud, and money-laundering, as· a result of a lack of regulation and accountability. 28 The non-profit
sector has become increasingly concerned since 1992 with questions of accountability, ethics, and
public relations. The non-profit sector's poor reputation and concerted effort to improve public
relations is an indicator of the weak linkages with society--that is, the weak flow of information and
ideas to and from such associations and society. Moreover, the deliberately non-political stance of
associations, a direct result of the anti-politics attitude developed during the communist regime,
effectively constrains the development of direct relations with political parties.
Of larger concern are state attempts to control opinion and the availability and use of
information. In November 1993, parliament acted to constrain the exchange of ideas by amending
the penal code to provide for imprisonment of up to two years for defamation of high government
officials; the law was repealed the following April in the wake of vigorous international protest at its
chilling effect. 29 The government was once again forced to back away from an amendment proposed
in September 1995 to the 1991 Law on the Periodic Press that would have restricted the right of
reporters to maintain confidentiality of sources, curtailed their access to state information, and
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provided for a broad and potentially chilling interpretation of the "right of reply. "30 Widely viewed as
an attack on press freedoms, the amendment also highlighted the lack of a standard procedure for any
citizen to obtain information from the state and the lack of a means for enforcing the right to
information. 31 Although the proposed amendment was pulled for further review, Czech journalists
later argued that some of the same strictures entered through the back door in conflict-of-interest
legislation passed in November 1995: this legislation, which enjoins civil servants to silence about·
information acquired on the job, prompted journalist Tomas Rychly to complain that the government
was using justified limitation on use of official information for personal gain to maintain its more
general informational monopoly, and to remind the public of official reluctance to pass enabling laws
to back up constitutional guarantees of access to information. 32
Communication between the unions and the government is weak and indirect, coming largely
in the form of government response to union demonstrations and strikes rather than the RDSP
corporatist arrangement. Prime Minister Klaus disparaged a March 1994 rally against the labor law
amendments, and then one month later told delegates to the major trade union congress that unions
should concentrate attention on the workplace rather than lobbying the government. 33 A strike called
in December 1994 to protest proposed pension legislation was similarly criticized, and
demonstrations in early 1995 were reportedly dismissed by Klaus as "absurd." From belittling

30

31

32

33

'Stanovisko ceskeho helsinskeho vyboru k navrhu tiskoveho zakona,' Zpravodaj ceskeho helsinskeho vyboru. No.4 (1995). pp; 6-11;
Prague Post, 21 March 1995, p.11. in FBIS-EEU 95-065 (5 April 1995). pp.8-9.

The press complains that the general policy appears to be, 'what isn't explicitly allowed, is prohibited,' as opposed to the general Western
policy of. 'what isn't explicitly prohibited, is allowed;' see Respekt, p.11.

CTK Survey of Czech Press. 20 February 1996.

Jiri Pehe. RFE/RL Daily Digest, 11 April 94.

18

remarks about planned rallies to a stated preference for weak unions, from questioning union ·
involvement in certain social policy areas to refusing to discuss some issues at all, the government
clearly has a shown a reluctance to engage unions in the policymaking process. The overall pattern,
then, is of government policy that does not tend to nurture the exchange of information, ideas, and
opinion between state and society.

The Policymaking Process in the Czech Republic
In this section, we are concerned with access to the policymaking process, broadly construed
to encompass the generation of policy initiatives, the legislative process itself, and
extra-parliamentary processes such as policy made through corporatist negotiations. 34 In the Czech
Republic, legislative proposals can originate from the government (including the ministries),
representatives, senators, or even from regional units of govemment. 35 Not surprisingly, the most
common source of proposals has been the cabinet, in part because members of the coalition parties
usually channel proposals through that forum, in part because proposals generated outside the
government have less chance of success, and in part because the Senate was not constituted until
January 1997 and the regional units have yet to be constituted at all.
The delayed establishment of the Senate and the regional governments are worth
consideration in their own right. The constitution of the Czech Republic, passed in December 1992
with little time to spare before independence on 1 January 1993, contained provision for the creation
of both a Senate and regional governments. The Klaus government, in defiance of the concerns of its
junior coalition partners, consistently proved indifferent to remedying what soon came to be referred
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to as "constitutional debts" --the postponement of authorizing legislation to implement the
constitutional mandate for these institutions. Klaus was widely understood to be in no hurry to
constitute additional rival power centers beyond the direct control of his government, and indeed, it
was 1995--less than a year before the next parliamentary election and almost three years after the
legislative ratification of the constitution--before the formula for Senate elections was enacted.
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Regional reform, which Klaus repeatedly and explicitly spumed as a priority of his government, was
postponed still further. What is significant for the character of the policymaking process we consider
here is that these constitutional debts have had the effect of restricting the number of access points
for associational input into political decisionmaking. Thus, parliamentary action is the sole venue of
policymaking, one that the government continues, now somewhat tenuously, to dominate.
Legislative proposals begin as broad principles developed by the legislative section of the
originating ministry, but there is no formal process; a legislative analyst typically examines the
current law, previous ministry positions, the current government position and relevant EU laws. Any
consultation with experts or interested parties outside the ministry occurs at the discretion of the
legislative analyst and the legislative section head. Only rarely, in fact, do ministries consult with
outsiders, and even then on a case-by-case basis; some ministries never consult with outsiders at all. 37
Upon receiving declarations of the conditions under which the .principles would. be acceptable from
the Office for Legislative and Public Administration and other relevant ministries, 38 the originating
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ministry considers how to incorporate these conditions in the full legislative proposal, which is then
forwarded to the government for discussion and evaluation at one of its regular legislative sessions;
if approved, the proposal is sent to parliament.
It should be noted that proposals initiated by the government leave very little scope for
participation by non-government actors. It is only during the period when general principles are
being formulated that non-government actors may become involved, and even then only on an
informal and irregular basis. The number of proposals originating with representatives (and
eventually with senators) has been increasing, though, which could provide more opportunity for
outside experts or interest groups to influence policymaking. Unfortunately, however, these
proposals currently tend to be poorly developed, and their chances of success are very low without
direct government backing.
The legislative process itself offers little additional access to the policy process. The
opportunity for external input, which could occur only at the committee level, is itself
uninstitutionalized: involvement by outsiders occurs only by invitation of the committee majority,
and is often limited merely to being present; only rarely does an outside actor have the opportunity to
answer questions or provide information of any kind. 39 In addition, it is only in the second stage of
the three-stage legislative process, on the bill's second reading, that the substance of a bill may be
amended.
The legislative process is not the only formal arena for policymaking, however. Policymaking
on various socio-economic issues is undertaken in extra-parliamentary negotiations by the corporatist
RDSP .40 General agreements were signed annually between 1991 and 1994, but negotiations broke
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down without resolution in 1995 and 1996. The government's position in these negotiations is quite
strong, as the Employers' Associations have no real power and the ability of unions to call or
maintain strikes is very questionable. 41 The issues of social and health insurance, price regulation,
and wage regulation are major points of conflict. The only action on social and health insurance
occurred in 1992, when pressure from the Employers' Associations, supported by the unions, led to
adjustments in social insurance; The government refused to discuss price regulation in 1993, ·in the ·
face of unexpectedly high price increases; it has continued to bar discussion in subsequent years. The
issue of wage regulation has internally divided both the Employers' Association and the unions,
which leaves the government with a free hand for its preferred policy in the negotiations. The
government only moved to end wage regulation in July 1995 in response to threatened strikes; it also
raised the salaries for government employees in education and health. This overview suggests that
although the RDSP is configured as a corporatist forum, it is unable to act as one.

It should be obvious that the policymaking process in the Czech Republic is currently
somewhat closed, providing only limited support for the development of associational activity, and
constricting the access of external actors seeking to influence state actions. Martin Potucek, Professor
of Social and Public Policy at Charles University, sums up this situation well:
'Many politicians who recently entered the political arena have not sufficiently
realized that expertise is important for the oojectification of their decisions on affairs
of public interest. Many experts are disgusted by their futile attempts to offer their
knowledge to those who make decisions .. .lt is possible to say that many
representatives (including some ministers) feel a greater and more direct
responsibility to the secretariats of their political parties.' 42
Even the formally-sanctioned social partnership negotiations have in fact been dominated by the
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governnient. 43 The development of associations, which play an important role in the aggregation of
interests, the generation of initiatives, and the communication of information, ideas, and interests has
been stunted by the inadequacy of the legislative framework, by the poor reputation of associations
in the eyes of both the government and the general public, and by.the highly constrained
opportunities for outside access to the process of policy formation and implementation.
Policymaking in the Czech Republic is. therefore overwhelmingly elite-dominated, the sole province
of the government. 44
Adam Przeworski has warned, in a detailed analysis of the Polish economic transition, that a
technocratic approach to the policy agenda of transitional regimes may have deleterious
consequences for the legitimation of new political institutions as well as for the efficacy of the policy
itself. The Polish government's disregard for the preservation of the safety net and for the
psychological shock of unemployment, he argues, worked not only to render the economic transition
unduly painful, but to undercut the popular credibility of the nascent political institutions as well. 45
He sees the two things as interconnected--closed policymaking facilitated the disregard and
underestimation of social security issues of central concern to the public. Our analysis here suggests
that similar problems plague Czech politics. In Poland, the Przeworski analysis turned out to herald
the defeat of the architects of transition at the hands of the ex-communists in the 1993 elections, a
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seeming confirmation of the costs of insensitivity to public input. We now tum to the question of the
ways in which citizen participation in Czech politics shows similar signs of stress.

Political Participation
Thus far, we have sketched some important features of the shape of public opinion and the
character of the policymaking process that raise questions about the effectiveness of mass-elite
linkages. In this section, the central question is whether and in what ways these potentially
worrisome signs are reflected in political behavior. The focus here is therefore on patterns of political
participation, both in electoral politics and in the expression of political demands and preferences
between elections.
Czech politics had been notable for its stability in governance since 1990. Despite the
fragmentation and fluidity of the party system--a phenomenon widely visible in the post-communist
transitions generally--both governments formed in the first two electoral cycles survived the full
parliamentary term. The parliamentary elections of June 1996, however, came as a surprise for the
Klaus government, whose coalition had been expected to_retain its majority. Table 3, summarizing
the outcome of the polling, reflects an erosion of the former governing coalition in parliament that
proved insufficient to supplant it, but more than sufficient to render it a minority government.
Although the ODS gained ground over 1992 in the booming capital and its hinterland, its support
levels elsewhere stagnated or declined. Analysts accused the party of mounting a lackluster,
complacent and backwardlooking campaign that failed to address the social issues we have
emphasized here as popularly salient.46
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The showing of the Klaus coalition might have been the subject of envy for other right-center
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governments in the region, who almost uniformly suffered outright defeat at the hands of
ex-communist successor parties and were unable to cling to power even as a minority government. 47
Nonetheless, the existing distribution of seats is problematic for several reasons. The first is of
course, greater vulnerability of minority governments and their concomitant limitations in pursuing·a
coherent policy agenda. But lying behind the existing situation is a related problem; the very
existence of a minority government reflects a dispersion of political tendencies significant enough to
forestall the forging of a parliamentary majority. The substantial fringe delegations were deemed
uncoalitionable by all the moderate parties, and the Social Democrats, necessary to the formation of
any majority coalition of moderates, had made pre-election pledges not to enter a coalition with
Klaus and ODS. The Klaus government only survived the inaugural vote of confidence thanks to the
deliberate absence of the Social Democrats, but in return Klaus agreed not to oppose CSSD leader
Milos Zeman in his bid to become Speaker of the House of Deputies. Klaus and his coalition must
now govern with the tacit and uncertain support of a party that has been highly critical of government
approaches to the core social questions of the economic transition.
We suggest that the profile of attitudes and political processes we have outlined above is
central to the interpretation of the unexpected erosion of the Klaus majority. The dramatic fourfold
increase of Social Democratic support is notable because the party emphasized precisely the issues
on which public opinion showed increasingly disaffection with the government responsiveness, such
as housing and health care. STEM polls confirmed the Social Democrat appeal; although some
respondents questioned the realism of their promises, it nonetheless receives clear popular credit for
safeguarding social benefits.
The Senate elections of November 1996 were also an unpleasant event for the coalition
government, but for rather different reasons. Control of the less-powerful Senate is not as
consequential as control of the House of Deputies; by a simple majority, the House of Deputies may
47
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enact any legislation rejected by the Senate. However, it will--as Klaus seems to have
expected--provide an alternative forum for consideration of issues and critique of government
policy--a forum that the government cannot perhaps dismiss as readily as it does societal groups. The
first round of balloting was marred by 35% turnout and indicated a potential landslide for ODS.
Three of the four senators elected in the first round of balloting were ODS, and ODS candidates led
in 73 out of the remaining 77 single-member districts; in a plurality-vote system, ODS would have
gained 76 out of the 81 Senate seats. 48 Interestingly, the strong showing of ODS was not repeated in
the second round of balloting, as leaders and supporters of the other coalition parties openly backed
CSSD candidates wherever they competed with ODS. In the end, ODS only won 32 seats.
Although ODS is the largest party in the Senate, the results of the election are not a
vindication of Klaus and his party's policies. First, the dramatically lower voter turnout between the
parliament and senate elections, 76% versus 30-35%, gives the new legislative body only weak
legitimization. The low turnout is blamed on several factors: protest against government policies, a
series of scandals afflicting almost all parties, election weariness, and a lack of understanding of the
Senate's role. Second, ODS contested the Senate with an election manifesto that placed decided
emphasis on social policy, anti-corruption, and other sensitive issues on which the public perceives
previous government unresponsiveness; before the election, CSSD leader Zeman had indignantly
charged theft of CSSD's election program. Third, ODS' erstwhile coalition partners effectively
abandoned the coalition in favor of the leading opposition party, widening a rift in the coalition that
has been developing since 1993 and that reflects the same restiveness with Klaus's lack of
responsiveness to the views of coalition partners that the public perceives to its concerns. Fourth, the
leader of the trade organization CMKOS and implacable foe of Klaus, Richard Falbr, won a Senate
seat as an independent, thus providing labor a voice in the legislative process. Fifth, the election of
Klaus rival Petr Pithart as Chairman of the Senate, rejecting the ODS candidate and Klaus's
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well-known characterization of Pithart's period as prime minister of Czechoslovakia from 1990-92 as
a "failure." In the final analysis, the Senate election underscores both popular and elite concerns with
Klaus's stranglehold on policy content and the policy agenda.
A stunted response to popular malaise with the political system is reflected in the
experimentation of the major parties with initiatives designed to signal greater interparty democracy.
With some fanfare, the coalition parties introduced primaries for the selection of candidates for the
House of Deputies in spring 1996--a novelty in central Europe. The primaries themselves, however,
were greeted with considerable journalistic skepticism about the degree of top-level manipulation of
the process. Despite the poor showing of several leading ODS members, including deputies and
ministers, the leaders of ODS did not adjust the regional party lists, as was widely expected.
Subsequently, however, the August 1996 call for more intraparty discussion by Josef Zieleniec, ODS
member and Foreign Minister, was effectively squelched by Klaus. In September 1996, the Social
Democrats presented an alternative means of telegraphing leadership sensitivity to rank-and-file
concerns, by proposing the establishment of an intra-party referendum process. Regardless of the
extent to which such initiatives increase internal communications, they do not represent an
enhancement of associational linkages between state and society as such. In 1996, Klaus and ODS
also twice blocked draft legislation supported by most of the other parliamentary parties, that would
have established a parliamentary ombudsman to facilitate response to individual citizen grievances.
Leery of an office that would compete with ODS authority, Klaus instead countered in November
1996 by attaching to his own office a volunteer commission with one paid secretary to deal with
citizen suggestions and complaints.
Reinforcing the message of the limited leadership responsiveness to rival viewpoints is the
pattern of popular protest that has been reflected in strikes and demonstrations in recent years. Street
politics, even when the thrust is not a challenge to democratic ideas, is nonetheless a troubling
symptom of problems with the linkages between state and society.
Although formally included in the negotiations of the RDSP, labor has persistently felt
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rebuffed by the government in its attempts to influence policy. The labor law amendments passed in
March 1994 over trade union objections provoked a massive Prague protest rally that drew 20,000. 49
Months later, the unions organized a demonstration that drew upwards of 60,000 people, the largest
demonstration since the Velvet Revolution, in a challenge to government plans to raise the pension
age, introduce tuition for universities and cut the budget for child support. 5°Further threats of strikes
in July 1995 forced the government to deal with wage regulation and government salaries. As the
confrontational relationship between labor and government has continued, it is clear that the point of
contention is not individual policy disagreements, but the status of the unions themselves. The
pattern of frustrated protest described here is particularly notable because the unions ostensibly have
a voice in the tripartite social partnership mandated to negotiate such issues. As we have seen,
however, the domination of the RDSP by the government has meant that there is no effective
institutional channel for pressing labor concerns, and the result has been periodic recourse to the
streets in the effort to compensate by means of direct popular pressure for what is absent in the
regular political process.
The government approach to labor political activism unapologetically extends to other
associations, and engenders conflict in those spheres as well. Its protracted battle with the medical
profession over pay, working hours, obsolete equipment, etc., arose from frustration at the
government's inaction on a wide range of health care issues, resulting in strikes in November 1995
and March 1996. In addition there have been environmental protests against the construction of a
nuclear power plant in South Bohemia, the placement of a new highway in Central Bohemia, and the
licensing of a gold mine in the ecologically-sensitive Kasperske hory region in South-West Bohemia.
These conflicts seem to reflect a generalized frustration with government resistance to the
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development of associations, and with the quality and scope of access to policymaking processes that
might serve as a means of negotiating social conflict. Indeed, the public character of these protests
themselves reflect the breakdown or weakness of regularized channels of input into the policy
process. Of course, the weakness of associational activity in the post-communist setting is not merely
a product of government hostility or indifference; formidable organizational obstacles abound in any
case and are evident in other countries. What is important is the degree to which the early experience
of weakly institutionalized societal input into the policy process may prove a longer term
impediment to the flow of information between political elites and mass public, and even to the
stability of the political system.

Conclusion
It is, of course, not uncommon for sitting governments to face popular dissatisfaction with its
policy priorities and directions -- a circumstance for which regular elections are the intended
corrective. What we argue here is that public malaise about certain key issues in the Czech Republic
reflects more than just conflicts over policy and priorities; rather, this malaise stems from
dissatisfaction with the existing channels of access and influence between mass and elites.
These problems with the constricted mass-elite linkage not only represent part of the
underlying message of the 1996 elections, but are also reflected in the surfacing of various
confrontations with the government over the course of key policies, policies such as crime, housing,
health, corruption, the environment, and living standards; these policy confrontations moved several
key segments of society to extremism and political demonstrations, and have a broader political
constituency grounded in popular concern with a range of sensitive issues that the government is not
addressing.
Does this mean that Czech democracy is in serious trouble? Czech post-communist
governments have achieved certain notable successes in maintaining a positive international image
and effectively handling certain aspects of the economic transition in a largely technocratic style that
has indeed muted dissatisfaction so evident elsewhere, through deft manipulation of the job security
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issue. However, this short-term strategy carries the costs of failure to create and nurture routinized
channels of input for popular concerns. This stunting of the political process--an unevenness in the
evolution of democratic institutions and processes--carries risks for the management of future
political controversy. If a rich and variegated associational life, with regularized access to the
corridors of power, is an important augmentation of the episodic and imprecise mass-elite linkage
provided in the electoral connection, then democratic institutions that lack variegated information
channels and access points risk starving themselves of needed corrective input. It is not impossible,
of course, that this situation may be remedied over time. Yet the interim costs, in terms of
augmenting the alienation expressed by some in opinion polls and solidifying support for extremist
parties, are far from negligible.
Here, we have used a single case to argue for the value of attention to the patterns of
state-society interaction beyond electoral politics, what Schmitter calls "partial regimes," defined by
exchanges between government and civil society. 51 This study suggests that the linkage deficits that
are characteristic of the post-communist experience regionally are not merely a legacy of the stunted
social landscape of the preceding period and the absence of established autonomous institutions
under communism. This legacy exists, and places a special burden on post-communist
democratization projects to create institutional contexts and climates of opinion that enhance civic
competence to influence policy, since the episodic electoral connection alone cannot bear the weight
of democratization. However, it would seem that the weak mass-elite linkages may also reflect a
post-communist style of governance that itself discourages regularized citizen and associational
input. The fact that the Czech Republic, widely regarded as "bloc champ" in the transformation
process, manifests so many deficits in this regard is striking, and suggests that comparative attention
to this problem in the post-communist setting would yield rich returns. At a time when street politics
have dominated state-society communication in Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, the broader regional
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implications of the frailty of mass-elite linkages should no longer be of secondary concern, since a
punctuated politics of elections and street demonstrations is a politics that substantially removed
citizens from the deliberative processes of democracy.

Table 1
Problems Considered "Urgent" by the Public

Issue
Corruption
Crime, Security
Orgzd Crime/Mafia
Health Care
Social Security
Housing
Environment
Living Standards
Agriculture

More
96
97
92
94
92
84
90
91
82

Urgency
Less
3
2
6
4
7
12
8
8
10

Govt Response
Good
Bad

Action
Index

6
11
12
20
23
15
24
25
17

.90
.86
.80
.75
.69
.69
.67
.66
.65

89
87
78
76
74
76
71
72
69

Source:
IVVM, 'Ktere problemy povazuje verejnost za nalehave, jak se o jejich reseni
stara vlada,' 17 May 1995.
This is a listing of only the most urgent issues, omitting issues that generated negative or lower
positive Action Index ratings. "More" urgency comprises responses of "Very Urgent" and
"Urgent", while "less" urgency comprises responses of "Somewhat Urgent" and "Not Urgent";
"good" government response comprises responses of "Very Good" and "Fairly Good", while
"bad" government response comprises responses of "Fairly Bad" and "Very Bad". The Action
Index is calculated as (More Urgency - Good Govt Response)/100, so that numbers approaching
+1.00 reflect an increasingly inadequate government response.

Table 2
The Three Most Important Problems Facing the Czech Republic

Crime
Social Policy
Devt of the Economy
Health
Living Standards
Foreign Policy
Nine Other Issues

#1

#2

#3

Total Party Best For Problem?

19
16
20
6
6
4
29
100

19
14
8
15
9
8
27
100

17
12
7
10
8
7
39
100

55
42
35
31
23
19

Republicans, ODS
CSSD
ODS
CSSD, ODS
CSSD
ODS

Source:
STEM, Trendy 4/1996, "Nejdulezitejsi problemy CR a schopnost politickych
stran j e resit."
Respondents indicated the three most important problems and the party that was best able to
resolve each of those problems. The "Total" column shows the percentage ofrespondents that
rated a problem in the top three.

Table 3
1996 Election Results
House of Deputies
1992 Elections
1996 Elections
% Vote # Seats
% Vote # Seats
Coalition Parties
ODS-KDS
KDU-CSL
ODA

Pro-System Opposition Parties
CSSD
SD-LSNS
Moravian-Silesian Parties 1
Other smaller parties

Anti-System Opposition Parties
KSCM/LB
SPR-RSC

Senate 1996
Elections
# Seats

30
6
6
42

76
15
14
105

30
8
6
44

68
18
13
99

32
13
7
52

7
7
1
2
17

16
16
6
18
56

26
2
14

61

25

42

1
8
70

22
27

14
6
20

35
14
49

11
8
19

22
18
40

2
2

Sources:
Compiled from Central Election Commission data; Jan Obrman, 'The
Czechoslovak Elections,' RFE/RL Research Report 1:26 (26 June 1992), pp. 12-19; OMRI Daily
Digest, 3 June 1996.
ODS= Civic Democratic Party, KDS = Christian Democratic Party, KDU-CSL = Christian
Democratic Union and People's Party, ODA= Civic Democratic Alliance, CSSD = Czech Social
Democratic Party, KSCM = Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, LB= Left Bloc,
SPR-RSC = Association for the Republic and Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, SD-LSNS =
Free Democrats and Liberal-National Party.

1

2

The evolution ofMoravian-Silesian regional parties defies explanation in this table.

This includes one seat for the Democratic Union, which missed the representation cutoff in the 1996 House of
Deputies elections, and one seat for Richard Falbr, an independent sponsored by CSSD.

